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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are the parent of an infant child suffering under the effects of a
medical condition that is treatable, but potentially fatal. Suppose further that the
health care provider you have contracted with to provide critical services necessary
for your child’s welfare negligently fails to act in a manner that would prevent the
673
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condition from worsening and your child dies. It is clear that the medical condition
was a cause of your child’s death, but timely action by the health care provider might
have prevented the tragedy. Does the child’s estate have a viable cause of action
sounding in tort against the health care provider,1 and if so how do you determine the
damages? The answer depends, in large part, upon probabilities. What was the
probability your child would have died even if the health care provider had not acted
negligently? What was the probability of survival after the negligent failure to act by
the health care provider? What if these probabilities are unknown or unknowable?
Prior to the 1996 Ohio Supreme Court decision in Roberts v. Ohio Permanente
Med. Group, Inc.,2 if your child had a less than 50% chance of survival before the
negligent act, under Ohio law there would be no cause of action.3 In Roberts, the
court changed direction and recognized a plaintiff’s cause of action for the loss of a
less-than-even chance of recovery or survival.4 However, Roberts leaves unanswered
some important questions and has caused a great deal of confusion among courts,
scholars, and practicing lawyers. In particular, Roberts has left uncertainty as to
whether, under Ohio law, the loss-of-chance doctrine is merely a change in the
standard of causation or whether it has created an entirely new compensable injury.5
1

Causes of action for wrongful death are in the hands of the decedent’s estate. Action for
Wrongful Death, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (West 2002), states:
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if
death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued,
or the administrator or executor of the estate of such person, as such administrator or
executor, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances which make it
aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter. When the action is against such
administrator or executor, the damages recovered shall be a valid claim against the
estate of such deceased person. No action for the wrongful death of a person may be
maintained against the owner or lessee of the real property upon which the death
occurred if the cause of the death was the violent unprovoked act of a party other than
the owner, lessee, or a person under the control of the owner or lessee, unless the acts
or omissions of the owner, lessee, or person under the control of the owner or lessee
constitute gross negligence.
When death is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default in another state or
foreign country, for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages is given
by a statute of such other state or foreign country, such right of action may be enforced
in this state. Every such action shall be commenced within the time prescribed for the
commencement of such actions by the statute of such other state or foreign country.
The same remedy shall apply to any such cause of action now existing and to
any such action commenced before January 1, 1932, or attempted to be commenced in
proper time and now appearing on the files of any court within this state, and no prior
law of this state shall prevent the maintenance of such cause of action.
2

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996), overruling Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of
Cincinnati, Inc. 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
3

Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971) overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480.

4

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481. “The time has come to discard the traditionally harsh
view we previously followed and to join the majority of states that have adopted the loss-ofchance theory.” Id. at 484.
5

See id. at 481.
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This Note will examine specific language used in the Roberts decision and the law in
Ohio after Roberts.
The central argument advanced in this Note is that a loss of chance should be
recognized as an independent injury. This approach best serves the policy of the new
loss of chance doctrine, and it avoids the very significant doctrinal problems that
arise if the alternative approach is taken, which is to treat the compensability of lost
chances as merely a relaxation of traditional tort law causation requirements. The
primary focus of this Note is on the loss of a less-than-even chance of recovery or
survival,6 wherein a victim will be entitled to damages resulting from the negligent
reduction of the chance of avoiding adverse physical consequences that followed the
defendant’s negligent act or omission.7
Part II of this note discusses the historical development of the loss-of-chance
doctrine and observes that this allegedly new doctrine of loss-of-chance can be
traced back much further than most scholars and courts generally recognize. Judge
Learned Hand used the loss-of-chance rationale over forty years before the case most
often credited with establishing the doctrine.8 Part II also presents an overview of
the three primary approaches employed by various jurisdictions in dealing with the
tortiously destroyed loss-of-chance situation. In addition, Part II discusses why the
loss-of-chance doctrine has been limited almost exclusively to cases of medical
malpractice and why the doctrine is not likely to expand beyond this area of tort law
in the future. This fact in itself turns out to have policy consequences relevant to the
argument presented in this Note. Finally, Part II presents and scrutinizes the holding
in Roberts.
Part III discusses the doctrinal problem left unresolved by Roberts (i.e., the injury
vs. causation dilemma). Part III also examines how Ohio courts have applied Roberts
in subsequent cases and how the lack of clear guidance by the Ohio Supreme Court
has led lower courts to interpret Roberts incorrectly and inconsistently. Finally, Part

6

In other words, this Note will not discuss the distinct, and much more problematic,
question of whether Ohio law should compensate lost chances where the victim had betterthan-even chances of experiencing the desired outcome before the defendant’s negligent act.
In Roberts, the court limited the application of the loss-of-chance doctrine to cases where the
victim initially had a less than 50% chance of survival before the health care provider’s
negligent act or omission. See id. at 481. However, at least one prominent scholar has
advocated applying the loss-of-chance doctrine in all cases of tortiously reduced loss-ofchance regardless of the victim’s chances of survival before the negligent act or omission. See
generally Joseph H. King, “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of
the Loss-of-A-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 492 (1998) [hereinafter King,
Reformulation].
7

This Note addresses loss-of-chance of recovery or survival when it is manifested in a
physical result. Questions concerning the doctrine’s applicability can arise in the context of a
claim for future damages, medical monitoring, and mental distress (frequently in the context
of toxic torts). However, a discussion of the application of the doctrine in those cases is
beyond the scope of this Note and is covered extensively by other authors. See, e.g., John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002); Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme,
52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993).
8

Compare Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1925), with Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
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III recommends clarifying the definition of the injury as the loss-of-chance itself and
clarifying the standard of causation as the traditional preponderance standard.
Part III.D addresses anticipated counterarguments to the suggested refinements to
the loss-of-chance doctrine advocated by this Note. Part IV summarizes the
recommendations for modifying and clarifying the law concerning loss-of-chance in
Ohio and concludes the Note.
II. OVERVIEW OF LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE
A. Background
The nearly universal circumstance in which the loss-of-chance doctrine has been
employed in the United States has been in the medical malpractice context and
involves a patient suffering from a preexisting condition.9 The health care provider
negligently fails to prevent the adverse consequences from progressing (usually from
a delay in proper diagnosis or treatment) frequently resulting in the loss of the
patient’s life or permanent disability.10 Under the loss-of-chance doctrine, the
plaintiff would be compensated for the extent to which the defendant’s negligence
reduced the plaintiff’s chance of survival or achieving a more favorable outcome.11
Some scholars and courts see the doctrine primarily as a theory of causation,12 while
others place more emphasis on the valuation aspect of damages.13 In practice, courts
have struggled with both problems.14 These problems concerning lost chances must
be evaluated in light of the traditional requirements to maintain a cause of action for
negligence.

9
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2002); see also David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1765, 1800 n.42 (1997).
10

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 492; see also Martin J. McMahon, Annotation,
Medical Malpractice: Measure and Elements of Damages in Actions Based on Loss of
Chance, 81 A.L.R. 4th 485, §1(a) (1990) [hereinafter McMahon, Loss of Chance].
11

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 492, 545-46.

12

See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 605, 605 (2001) (describing loss-of-chance as a novel theory of causation).
13

See, e.g., Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294 (Md. 1987) (finding that the lost chance
theory does not create a new tort, but rather a redefinition of damages, so that a plaintiff’s
compensation for the loss of chance is a percentage of the full amount of damages sustained);
see generally King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 491, 516-46, 554.
14
See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978) (focusing on loss-of-chance from
perspective of causation); Delaney v. Cade 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994) (examining cases
addressing causation aspects of loss-of-chance and valuation of damages aspects of loss-ofchance); see also John D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: “Loss of Chance”
Causality 54 A.L.R.4th 10 (1987), for a survey of cases addressing the causation aspect of lost
opportunity; Martin J. McMahon, Damages for Loss of Chance of Cure, 12 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3d 621 (1991) [hereinafter McMahon, Damages for Loss of Chance], for a detailed
discussion of cases dealing with the valuation of damages aspects of lost opportunity.
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B. Elements of Negligence–Generally
Traditionally, to prove medical malpractice, the plaintiff’s claim is based on the
tort of negligence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving five elements.15 First,
the plaintiff must prove the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff/victim.16 In the
context of loss-of-chance, this duty is often a duty to act to protect the plaintiff
against some injury from a preexisting condition and is based on a special
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.17 Second, the plaintiff must
prove, usually through expert testimony, that the defendant breached his duty (i.e.,
the defendant failed to conform to the relevant standard of care).18 The breach of
duty in loss-of-chance cases is almost always an act of omission rather than
commission.19
The third element the plaintiff must prove is that the defendant’s act or omission
was the cause in fact of the injury he suffered.20 The plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that but-for the defendant’s wrongful conduct the
injury would not have occurred.21 Satisfaction of the burden of persuasion in a
normal civil case “requires that the trier of fact find that the existence of the
proposition to be proved is more probably true than not true.”22 The Roberts court
stated the general rule in medical malpractice cases under Ohio law “is that the
plaintiff must prove causation through medical expert testimony in terms of
probability to establish the injury was, more likely than not, caused by the
defendant’s negligence.”23 Courts that apply the loss-of-chance doctrine have in

15

W. PAGE KEETON
(5 ed. 1984).

ET AL.,

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65

th

16
See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see also James Lockhart, Cause of Action for
Medical Malpractice Based on Loss of Chance of Cure, 4 COA2d 1, 19 (1994) (the relevant
standard of care is proven through expert testimony).
17

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1963-1964 Main Vol.); see also King,
Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497.
18

See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see also Lockhart, supra note 16, at 20.

19

See generally McMahon, Loss of Chance, supra note 10.

20

See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65.

21

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497; see also Robertson, supra note 9, 1784
(expert testimony is generally required to establish but-for causation in medical cases). Courts
often emphasize that it is a mistake to insist on too much certainty when applying the but-for
test especially when the plaintiff relied upon the defendant (and the relevant standard of care)
to protect against injury from the very type of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed. See
Robertson, supra note 9, at 1774. In addition, courts have often found “where the negligence
of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident … and is of a character naturally
leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened without negligence
is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect.” Id. at 1775.
22

Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 301.05 (5th ed. 2001).

23

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 482.
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most cases modified this element;24 however, it has proven to be perhaps the most
confusing aspect of the doctrine.
Fourth, the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s breach of duty was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injury.25 Proximate cause requires that the injury be within
the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s breach of duty.26 Although the term
proximate cause is often mistakenly used as a synonym for causation generally,27
loss-of-chance cases decided in Ohio have focused primarily on issues of cause in
fact and proximate cause has not proved troublesome to plaintiffs.28
Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered a compensable injury.29 This element,
along with causation, has proven to be the primary challenge to plaintiffs in loss-ofchance cases.30 In the loss-of-chance context, questions of valuation are frequently
mistaken as questions of causation.31 Before a plaintiff can establish causation, he
has to know how to define the injury the defendant’s negligence allegedly caused
(i.e., the resulting physical injury or the lost chance itself). As discussed further in
Part III, in Ohio a significant question exists as to how to define the injury in loss-ofchance cases.32

24

See generally Delaney, 873 P.2d 175 (examining cases from several jurisdictions
addressing causation aspects of loss-of-chance and valuation of damages aspects of loss-ofchance); Hodson, supra note 14.
25

See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see also Lockhart, supra note 16, at 22-23.

26

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497.

27

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt.
a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
28

Compare Starkey v. St. Rita’s Med. Ctr., 690 N.E.2d 57, 63 (3d Dist. Ohio Ct. App.
1997) (interpreting Roberts to mean the plaintiff need not prove by a reasonable probability
that the defendant’s medical malpractice was the “proximate cause” of plaintiff’s injury), with
Paul v. Metrohealth St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *7 (8th Dist. Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1998) (finding that the plaintiff’s expert failed to show that defendant’s
alleged medical malpractice was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury to a degree of
medical certainty or medical probability as required by Roberts; and holding that Roberts does
not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving “but-for” causation; and further holding that
plaintiff’s expert failed to demonstrate that “but-for” defendant’s actions either the risk of
harm to the decedent was increased or the decedent would have had a “chance of recovery”).
29

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497; see also KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-

65.
30

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497.

31
Id. at 519. The confusion is particularly apparent in cases where the victim lost a chance
of less than 50%. In applying the loss-of-chance doctrine in this case, the percentage of
chance lost is relevant for purposes of valuing the plaintiff’s injury. That same percentage
should not be the basis of determining whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proving
causation. See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481.
32

See generally Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480; see discussion infra Part III.
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C. Development of the Doctrine of Loss-of-Chance
Though many courts and scholars trace the roots of the loss-of-chance doctrine in
the United States to the 1966 Fourth Circuit decision in Hicks v. United States,33 this
Note contends the doctrine is much older and more eminently placed: it surfaces at
least as early as a 1925 opinion by Judge Learned Hand in Zinnel v. United States
Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.34 Hicks involved a medical malpractice suit
where the decedent died from an intestinal disorder after being misdiagnosed.35 The
plaintiff’s experts testified that the decedent would have survived if given proper
treatment, but the defendant argued there was a failure of causation because even
with proper treatment, the patient’s survival was speculative.36 The court, in finding
causation had been established by the plaintiff, stated:
When a defendant’s negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated
a person’s chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to
raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond
the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of
survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it
possible to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have
happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to
pass. The law does not in the existing circumstances require the plaintiff
to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived had she been
hospitalized and operated on promptly.37
In Hicks, the court noted that both of the plaintiff’s experts testified that the
victim would have survived if operated on promptly, and the defendant did not
effectively contradict this testimony.38 Based on this evidence, the plaintiff arguably
proved that it was more likely than not that the defendant’s negligence caused the
victim’s death.39
I would go back further than Hicks, however, in finding similar reasoning used
by a court to find a plaintiff had established causation sufficient to get to the jury on
the question of negligence. In Zinnel, the decedent was a seaman who was swept
overboard in a storm at sea and he drowned after ineffectual efforts to rescue him.40

33

See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1368
n.53 (1981) [hereinafter King, Valuation]; see also, Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 482 (citing Hicks
v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966)).
34

10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925).

35

See Hicks, 368 F.2d at 626-27.

36

See id. at 629-32.

37

Id. at 632.

38

See id. at 632.

39

See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, Inc., 664 P.2d 474, 491
(Wash. 1983) (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (finding that, factually, Hicks does not support the lossof-chance doctrine because the plaintiff’s chance of survival was over 50%).
40

See Zinnel, 10 F.2d at 47.
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Judge Learned Hand, in addressing whether the failure by the defendant to maintain
a safety rope caused the loss, stated:
There … remains the question whether they might have also said that the
fault caused the loss. About that we agree no certain conclusion was
possible. Nobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the intestate
would have seized the rope, or, if he had not, that it would have stopped
his body. But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor are we justified,
where certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it. We cannot say that
there was no likelihood that a rope three feet above the deck … would not
have saved the seaman…. Considering that such lines were run for the
express purpose, among others, of protecting seamen, we think it a
question about which reasonable men might at least differ whether the
intestate would not have been saved, had it been there.41
While not specifically stating that the case was a loss-of-chance for survival case,
the court in Zinnel used essentially the same reasoning as later courts have used in
loss-of-chance cases.42
D. Various Approaches to the Tortiously Destroyed Loss-of-Chance Situation
Courts have not uniformly adopted the “substantial possibility” rule of Hicks,
which permits recovery even if there was only a substantial possibility of avoiding
the result but-for the tortious conduct.43 Since Hicks, courts have generally followed
one of three approaches to the tortiously destroyed loss-of-chance situation.
1. The Traditional “All or Nothing” Approach
The traditional approach to evaluating claims of lost chance of a more favorable
outcome focuses on causation and is known as the “all-or-nothing rule.”44 The
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but-for the defendant’s
negligence the plaintiff would not have suffered the harm.45 This approach is
essentially the traditional negligence analysis,46 and, while a minority position,47 is
still followed in several jurisdictions.48 If the plaintiff can prove causation by this
standard, damages will be awarded to the plaintiff in full (i.e., as though the

41

Id. at 49.

42

See, e.g., Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632.

43

See infra Parts II.D.1-3, II.F., and cases cited therein.

44

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 499.

45

See id.; see also Lockhart, supra note 16, at 14.

46

See Delaney, 873 P.2d at 183.

47

See id. at 183 (stating the traditional approach is probably now the minority position).

48

See, e.g., Williams v. Spring Hill Mem’l Hosp., 646 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Ala. 1994);
Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995); Abille v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (applying Alaska law); Hilden v. Ball, 787 P.2d 1122 (Idaho 1989); Clayton
v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439 (Miss. 1985).
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likelihood of success was 100%).49 If not, no damages will be awarded.50 This was
the approach of the Ohio Supreme Court prior to Roberts. In Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 51 the court reasoned:
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice
cases where physical well being, and life itself, are the subject of
litigation. The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally
direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for wrongful death an
injured person should be compensated for the loss of any chance for
survival, regardless of its remoteness. However, we have trepidations that
such a rule would be so loose that it would produce more injustice than
justice.52
Courts utilizing this rule place a great deal of weight upon the policy rationale
that tort liability should be based on fault and fault is only proven when the
defendant is more than 50% responsible for causing the injury.53 Additionally, many
courts may view this standard as being a more manageable and bright line approach
to resolving these questions.
The problem with this approach, and the reason a majority of the states have now
done away with it, is that it ignores the policy objectives of deterrence and
compensation,54 and places an emphasis on manipulating the rules because it forces
the parties to search out expert witnesses willing to say what each party needs to
show under the rule.55

49

See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1387-90; see generally McMahon, Loss of
Chance, supra note 10; see also KEETON, supra note 15, § 127, at 945-60 (discussing damages
under wrongful death statutes).
50

See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see generally McMahon, Loss of Chance, supra
note 10.
51
272 N.E.2d 97, 104, overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480. In Cooper, the court held
that plaintiff had the burden to prove the probability of victim’s survival absent the
defendant’s negligence. Id. The court held that probable means more than 50%. Id.
52

Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103, overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480.

53

See cases cited supra notes 46-48.

54

See Vincent R. Johnson & Alan Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 6-9 (2d ed. 1999).

55

See, e.g., De Burkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (reasoning that allowing
recovery for a lost chance, and not for all damages, is the most equitable approach; and further
reasoning that the all-or-nothing approach subverts deterrence objectives of tort law by
denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses; and
that by not recognizing a lost chance as a compensable interest, the all-or-nothing rule distorts
the loss assigning role of tort law and creates pressure to manipulate and distort other rules
affecting causation and damages, and places a premium on the search for a willing witness).
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2. Relaxed Proof of Causation Approaches
Courts following this second approach generally continue to view the underlying
physical injury or death as the ultimate injury for which the patient is compensated.56
The relaxed proof approach attempts to ameliorate what some courts view as the
harshness of the traditional “all-or-nothing approach.”57 In understanding how courts
can relax the traditional requirements of proving causation, it is useful to look at
what Professor Joseph H. King has identified as the “four dimensions” of the
causation requirement.58 The first aspect of causation is the “but-for” test.59 The
second dimension is the standard of proof, which defines the degree of certainty
required to establish causation.60 This usually means it was more likely than not that
the defendant’s tortious conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury.61 Third is the
sufficiency of the evidence, which, in medical malpractice cases, relates to the
requirements for expert testimony.62 The final dimension is the burden of proof.63
The burden of proving causation is normally on the plaintiff, but courts do, under
certain circumstances, shift the burden to the defendant.64
Some courts have relaxed either the standard of proof required or the sufficiency
of the evidence called for65 rather than defining the injury as the loss of chance for a
better result. A number of courts purporting to adopt some version of loss-of-chance
have relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323.66 However, there are

56

See, e.g., Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285-87; see generally Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance
of Survival Doctrine: Should the Court Ever Tinker with Chance?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 421, 432
(1992).
57
See generally Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d. 605 (Ariz. 1984);
McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653
N.E2d 1384 (Ind. 1995); Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483.
58

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497-98.

59

See id.

60

See id.

61

See id.

62

See id.

63

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497-98.

64

See Robertson, supra note 9, at 1781.

65
See, e.g., McKellips, 741 P.2d at 475; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
66

See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484; Thompson, 688 P.2d at 615; Hamil v. Bashline,
392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 474-75. In McKellips, the patient
died shortly after a physician negligently diagnosed the patient’s condition as minor. See
McKellips, 741 P.2d at 470. An expert testified that the plaintiff’s chances of survival would
have been significantly improved if the physician had not been negligent in his diagnosis, but
the expert could not reduce the lost chance to a statistical probability. See id. In adopting the
Section 323 approach, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff can show the
physician’s negligence caused a substantial reduction in the plaintiff’s chance of recovery or
survival, the question of proximate cause is for the jury, regardless of statistical evidence. See
id. at 474, 477.
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considerable differences among courts on whether and how juries should be
instructed under Section 323,67 and in fact significant disagreement often surrounds
whether a particular case is even a Section 323 case.68 In Roberts, the Ohio Supreme
Court indicated it recognizes the loss-of-chance theory and will follow the approach
set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323.69 Part III of this Note
discusses some of the problems and confusion with this approach as adopted by the
court in Roberts.70
Courts and commentators, in fact, call this the Restatement Section 323 approach. See,
e.g., Christopher Paul Reuscher, Note, McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals: This isn’t
Vegas, but don’t Tell the Courts—Playing with Percentages and the Loss-Of-Chance
Doctrine, 34 AKRON L. REV. 767, 777 (2001); Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss Of
Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV.
349, 356 (1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’
NOTE cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). “Section 323(a) was designed to relax a plaintiff’s
burden of proving causation, not to compound it.” McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725
N.E.2d 1117, 1123-24 (Ohio 2000) (citation omitted).
67
Compare Thompson, 688 P.2d at 615-16 (adopting Section 323 and allowing a jury to
consider evidence of an increase in harm on the issue of causation, but holding this did not
mean the jury was to be instructed on the rule, rather it was a rule allowing the court to permit
evidence of an increased risk of harm; and adding that the jury must still be instructed to find
for the defendant unless it finds a probability the defendant was a cause of the plaintiff’s
injury), with Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to jury instruction based on Section 323; and that proximate cause could be
established by evidence that the defendant’s negligent act or failure to act was a substantial
factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm; and adding that medical opinion need only show,
with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant’s conduct increased the risk
of harm ultimately sustained and it is then for the jury to decide whether the conduct was a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm).
68

See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, Inc., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.
1983). In Herskovits, a majority of the Washington Supreme Court found that recovery was
appropriate on behalf of a deceased patient whose chances of surviving cancer, according to
expert testimony, had been reduced from 39% to 25% as a result of the defendant’s failure to
properly diagnose the condition. See id. at 474 (voting 6-3 in favor of recognizing the
plaintiff’s cause of action for loss-of-chance). Two justices, of the six vote majority, held they
would allow wrongful death damages when the trier of fact found an act, which reduced the
chance of survival, to be a substantial factor in the death’s occurrence. Id. at 479. This view
could properly be classified as a relaxed standard of proof. Four justices in the majority,
however, found that it was the reduced chance of survival itself that was the compensable
injury. Id. at 487. These four justices indicated that because the experts agreed the
defendant’s negligence probably did not cause the death, damages could not, under established
principles of causation, be awarded if the injury was the death. Id. at 481 (Pearson, J.,
concurring). This view cannot fairly be described as a relaxed causation standard because
these justices found that the injury (defined as the loss of a less than even chance of survival)
was more likely than not caused by the defendant’s negligence. Id. at 487 (Pearson, J.,
concurring).
69

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484.

70

See discussion infra Part III. “Those plaintiffs utilizing this new cause of action no
longer must prove causation in terms of probability through the medical expert to establish
that the injury was, more likely than not, caused by the defendant’s negligence.” Starkey, 690
N.E.2d at 62 (citing Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 482-83). In Starkey, the court also stated:
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3. Pure Loss-of-Chance Approach
In 1981 Professor King wrote an extremely influential article on this subject
advocating that lost opportunity should generally be recognized as a legally
compensable harm and valued on a proportional basis.71 This approach defines the
injury as the loss of a chance of achieving a more favorable outcome,72 rather than
the subsequent death or physical injury. Defining the injury in this manner requires a
plaintiff to prove only that the defendant’s act or omission caused the loss of chance
rather than proving the act or omission caused the physical injury, a much more
difficult question of causation. Professor King advocates a proportional damage
approach that compensates an injured victim in proportion to their loss, whether that
loss is a 1% or 99% loss of chance.73 Professor King suggests that preexisting
conditions should be taken into account when valuing the interest destroyed.
Professor King would apply this approach broadly, including a reduction in damages
to reflect preexisting conditions in cases where a defendant tortiously and directly
causes physical injuries unrelated to the victim’s preexisting condition.74 A review
of the cases which Professor King himself cites as adopting this approach reveal that

“[a]lthough the plaintiff still has the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant brought about the harm plaintiff has suffered, the jury, rather than the
medical expert is given the task of balancing the probabilities.” Id. However, as an indication
of the confusion Roberts has created, Professor King, focusing on how the Ohio Supreme
Court holds damages should be valued in loss-of-chance cases, cites Roberts as an example of
the application of the loss-of-chance approach as opposed to the relaxed proof approach. See
King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 508.
71
Many courts that have adopted the loss-of-chance doctrine have relied on this article.
See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483-84 (citing King, Valuation, supra note 33). In 1998,
Professor King updated his views and provided some guidelines for when he feels it is
appropriate to apply the loss-of-chance doctrine. See King, Reformulation, supra note 7.
Some commentators refer to this approach as the “King Approach.” See, e.g., Reuscher, supra
note 66, at 778.
72

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 508-09.

73

See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1372-73 and 1381-87.

74

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 543. King states:
A special relationship, undertaking, or other basis supporting a preexisting duty should
not be required when a defendant’s active tortious conduct is proven to have probably
caused a materialized injury, and the only question is to what extent to reduce
damages for that injury to reflect the fact that the victim suffered from a preexisting
condition creating a possibility of harm independent of the tortious conduct. For
example, the doctrine should be applied to a situation in which an ambulance
transporting the victim to the hospital is struck by an eighteen-wheeler negligently
operated by the defendant, and the victim was immediately killed. The fact that prior
to the accident the victim was having a heart attack and had only a forty percent
likelihood of surviving should not, under the loss-of-a-chance doctrine, completely
preclude damages for the value of the victim’s life. Instead, it would call for an
appropriate reduction to reflect the effect of the preexisting condition on the interest
destroyed by the negligent operation of the truck.

Id.
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they have not fully adopted the “pure loss-of-chance” approach.75 In Roberts, the
Ohio Supreme Court approvingly cited Professor King’s article and adopted a
proportional approach to valuing the loss of a less than even chance of recovery or
survival; however, it is not clear Roberts agrees with Professor King’s definition of
the injury or application of the doctrine in cases where the plaintiff initially had a
greater than 50% chance of survival.76
E. Limited Scope of Loss-of-Chance Doctrine
Some scholars fear that the loss-of-chance doctrine is broad enough to swallow
up traditional negligence in any case of questionable causation.77 The practical
reality is, however, that the loss-of-chance doctrine is limited almost exclusively to
medical malpractice cases,78 and this reality is not likely to change. The reasons for
this involve both economic and policy considerations. In a 1997 article Professor
David Robertson notes:
[The historically] ‘protective attitude of the law toward the medical
[defendant]’ and a strong judicial tradition of deference to medical

75

See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 560 n.58. Professor King cites the following
cases as approving the loss-of-chance approach for some type of injuries: Delaney, 873 P.2d at
185; Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991); Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at
484. In Perez, the Supreme Court of Nevada adopted the loss-of-chance approach in a
medical malpractice case where the decedent patient had less than a 50% chance of survival
before the defendant’s negligence. See Perez, 805 P.2d at 592. The court held the amount of
damages was “equal to the percent of chance [of survival] lost [due to negligence] multiplied
by the total amount of damages which are ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death action.” Id.
at 592 (quoting McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476). The court defined the injury as not the death
itself, but rather as the decreased chance of survival caused by the medical malpractice. See
id. at 592. By defining the injury in this manner, the traditional rule of preponderance is fully
satisfied if the plaintiff can show, “to a reasonable medical probability, that some negligent act
or omission by health care providers reduced a substantial chance of survival.” Id. at 592.
The court declined to clarify what percentage reduction amounted to a substantial chance, but
doubted that a ten percent chance of survival would be actionable. See id. at 592. The court
made a very important point by noting “in cases where the chances of survival were modest,
plaintiffs will have little monetary incentive to bring a case to trial because damages would be
drastically reduced to account for the preexisting condition.” See Perez, 805 P.2d at 592.
76

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484-85; see also discussion, supra note 6 (discussing
differences between King’s approach and Roberts).
77

See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 12, at 605 (noting that the theory has a vastly broad
potential application to virtually every questionable case of causation, but cautioning that it
would be unwise to apply the doctrine so broadly that it would replace traditional causation
rules); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (noting that the lost-opportunity development has been halting
as courts have sought to find appropriate limits for this reconceptualization of legally
cognizable harm; and without limits, this reform is of potentially enormous scope, implicating
a large swath of tortious conduct in which there is uncertainty about factual cause, including
failures to warn, provide rescue or safety equipment, and otherwise take precautions to protect
a person from a risk of harm that exists).
78

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE
cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
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expertise led virtually all courts considering the problem [of the cause-infact burden on the plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit] to say that
expert testimony that proper medical treatment ‘would have increased the
patient’s chance [of achieving a better medical result] from, for example,
twenty to forty percent’ could not satisfy the plaintiff’s cause-in-fact
burden.79
Professor Robertson notes, however, that judicial attitudes regarding these
matters have changed, leading to the loss-of-chance approach in medical
malpractice.80 That same historical deference, however, has not been extended to
areas beyond medical malpractice. In a 1956 article, Professor Wex Malone
discussed the degree of proof of causation required by courts.81 He noted that where
the rule of conduct was designed to protect against the exact risk to which the
plaintiff was exposed, courts were likely to let plaintiffs get to the jury on a minimal
showing of causation,82 even when chances of rescue appeared slim;83 in these cases
policy considerations of fairness, full compensation to accident victims, and
deterrence favor a relaxed causation approach toward plaintiffs. 84
In addition to these policy reasons, strong economic considerations limit the use
of loss-of-chance doctrine. Because the kinds of physical injury situations that
implicate loss-of-chance are those in which courts already give plaintiffs a drastically
reduced burden of proof,85 plaintiffs would have little reason to invoke the loss-ofchance doctrine if it would have the effect of reducing their damages based on the
percentage of lost opportunity when the alternative under the relaxed causation
approach affords them full damages.86 Additionally, plaintiffs will rarely have the
ability to provide expert testimony on the percentage of opportunity lost, as this type
of information rarely exists outside the arena of medical malpractice. These reasons
may explain why courts and practitioners have only applied the loss-of-chance
theory to medical malpractice.

79

See Robertson, supra note 9, at 1784 (quoting from Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 86 (1956)).
80

See Robertson, supra note 9, at 1784-85.

81

See Malone, supra note 79, at 72-77.

82

See id.

83

See id.; see also Zinnel, 10 F.2d 47 (holding question of ship owner’s liability for failure
to properly maintain safety ropes and rescue a seaman that fell overboard and drowned should
be submitted to a jury).
84

See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 54.

85

See Fischer, supra note 12, at 652.

86

See generally Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970); McMullen, 725
N.E.2d 1117.
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F. Loss-of-Chance in Ohio After Roberts
1. Statement of the Case in Roberts
In Roberts,87 the plaintiff-appellant, executor of the patient-decedent’s estate,
brought a wrongful death suit against the defendants, which included an HMO, a
physician, and a hospital, for failure timely to diagnose and treat the victim’s lung
cancer.88 The plaintiff alleged a seventeen-month delay in the diagnosis and
treatment of the cancer.89 Expert testimony established that, even with timely
diagnosis and treatment, the victim had only a 28% chance of survival and
recovery.90 The plaintiff, relying on the loss-of-chance theory, argued the
defendant’s negligence decreased the decedent’s chance of survival from 28% to 0%,
and thus established a triable issue of fact.91 The trial court granted defendant’s
summary judgment motion relying on the authority of Cooper.92 In Cooper,93 Ohio
rejected the loss-of-chance theory in favor of the traditional causation requirement
that a result was more likely than not caused by the defendant’s act.94
2. Statement of the Holding in Roberts.
In overruling Cooper, the Roberts court joined the majority of states and adopted
the loss-of-chance doctrine. 95 The court stated:

87

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480.

88

See id. at 481.

89

See id.

90

See id.

91

See id.

92

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481 (citing Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97).

93

Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97, overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480.

94

In Cooper, the court stated:
In an action for wrongful death, where medical malpractice is alleged as the proximate
cause of death, and plaintiff’s evidence indicates that a failure to diagnose the injury
prevented the patient from an opportunity to be operated on, which failure eliminated
any chance of the patient’s survival, the issue of proximate cause can be submitted to a
jury only if there is sufficient evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment
and surgery the patient probably would have survived.
Id. at 104.
95
See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481, overruling Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97. The court stated:
[W]e recognize that our court has traditionally acted as the embodiment of justice and
fundamental fairness. Rarely does the law present so clear an opportunity to correct an
unfair situation as does this case before us. The time has come to discard the
traditionally harsh view we previously followed and join the majority of states that
have adopted the loss of chance theory. A patient who seeks medical assistance from a
professional caregiver has the right to expect proper care and should be compensated
for any injury caused by the caregiver’s negligence which has reduced his or her
chance of survival…. Thus, a health care provider should not be insulated from
liability where there is expert medical testimony showing that he or she reduced the
patient’s chances of survival. Unfortunately, under the traditional view this is precisely

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003

15

688

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:673

[W]e recognize the loss-of-chance theory and follow the approach set
forth in Section 323, Restatement of Torts. Under this view, we hold as
follows: In order to maintain an action for the loss of a less-than-even
chance of recovery or survival, the plaintiff must present expert medical
testimony showing that the health care provider’s negligent act or
omission increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff. It then becomes a jury
question as to whether the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the
plaintiff’s injury or death. Once this burden is met, the trier of fact may
then assess the degree to which the plaintiff’s chances of recovery or
survival have been decreased and calculate the appropriate measure of
damages. The plaintiff is not required to establish the lost chance of
recovery or survival in an exact percentage in order for the matter to be
submitted to the jury. Instead, the jury is to consider evidence of
percentages of the lost chance in the assessment and apportionment of
damages.96
The court held that to determine the amount of damages the jury should consider
expert testimony presented and determine the total amount of damages from the date
of the alleged negligence; ascertain the percentage of the patient’s lost chance of
survival or recovery; and multiply that percentage by the total amount of damages.97
The court provides the following illustration of how damages should be calculated:
the outcome…. We can no longer condone this view and consequently overrule
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.
Id. at 484.
96

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484.

97

See id. at 481, 484-85 (citing as rational the proportional damage approach advocated in
King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1381-1387, and the approach taken by the courts in
Delaney, 873 P.2d at 186-87; McKellips, 741 P.2d at 475-76).
A problem with this approach in determining damages is in what appears to be its
exclusive reliance on expert testimony concerning the percentage of the patient’s lost chance.
See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484. Assume a hypothetical case where the decedent was
suffering under the effects of a life threatening preexisting condition and all parties
acknowledge the defendant, a health care provider with whom the victim had a special
relationship under Section 323, was negligent (i.e., expert testimony establishes the applicable
standard of care and that the defendant breached that standard). Assume further that the
percentage of lost chance is unknowable and no expert can be persuaded to provide testimony
as to a statistical probability as to the loss-of-chance. The outcome of such a case under
Roberts is unclear.
Roberts specifically states that the plaintiff is not required to establish the lost chance in an
exact percentage in order for the matter to go to the jury. See id. Roberts did hold, however,
that to determine the amount of damages, the jury should consider expert testimony presented
and determine the total amount of damages from the date of the alleged negligence; ascertain
the percentage of the patient’s lost chance of survival or recovery; and multiply that
percentage by the total amount of damages. See id. Even if the jury found that the
defendant’s omission was the cause of the injury or death, how are they to handle the fact that
no expert will place a figure on the percentage of the patient’s lost chance? The court has not
ruled on a case like this; however, in Roberts, the discussion and the sole illustration of how
damages should be computed implies the court would not award damages in such a case
because of the lack of definitive statistical probability put forth by experts. See id. This result
would be counter to fundamental tort policies of fairness, compensating victims, and
deterrence. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 54.
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To illustrate … where the jury determines from statistical findings
combined with the specific facts relevant to the patient [that] the patient
originally had a 40% chance of cure and the physician’s negligence
reduced the chance of cure to 25%, (40%-25%) 15% represents the
patient’s loss of survival. If the total amount of damages proved by the
evidence is $500,000, the damages caused by the defendant is [sic] 15% x
$500,000 or $75,000.98
The Roberts court made clear that it was adopting the loss-of-chance doctrine in
medical malpractice cases. The problem is that the holding does not clearly tell us
what the injury is nor does it tell us what standard of causation the trier of fact must
apply.
III. THE “INJURY VS. CAUSATION” DILEMMA
Part III.A outlines the problem created by the different ways of approaching the
loss-of-chance doctrine and Part III.B illustrates the confusion and uncertainty
surrounding the doctrine in Ohio courts. Since Roberts was decided in 1996, courts,
practitioners, and commentators have had an opportunity to evaluate various
approaches to the loss-of-chance doctrine.99 Part III.C analyzes the problems created
by the Roberts decision and proposes recommendations for resolving the problems.
Specifically, this Note suggests the doctrine be clarified in two ways. First, the
injury in loss-of-chance cases should be clearly defined as the lost chance itself.
Second, the doctrine should clearly require a plaintiff meet the traditional standard of
proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence. These recommendations do
not advocate overruling Roberts or changing the doctrine; rather they are directed at
Professor Robertson has observed that “once we know [the defendant] has caused some
harm, we need not worry overmuch about making him pay too much.” See Robertson, supra
note 9, at 1794. Judge Posner also reminds us not to forget the difference between the causein-fact issue and the damage issue and has written, “a tort plaintiff’s burden of proving the
extent of his injury is not a heavy one. Doubts are resolved against the tortfeasor.” DePass v.
United States, 721 F.2d. 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting). Concerns over
equitable treatment of defendants and basing their liability on their proportional fault must be
considered in light of the fact that the plaintiff did not bargain for, nor knowingly submit to,
the increased risk the defendant’s negligence exposed him to. Rather, the victim relied on the
defendant to protect him from the very harm that has occurred. In fact, lack of statistics aside,
the reason we do not know more definitively whether the preexisting condition would have
taken the victim’s life is because the defendant’s tortious conduct removed any chance we
would have of knowing whether a more favorable outcome would have come to pass. While
that chance cannot be reduced to a specific statistical probability, all would agree it had
substantial value to the victim and his family. Under these circumstances, as a practical
matter, requiring a plaintiff to prove something that cannot be proven should not be required.
It is worth recalling Justice Frankfurter’s admonition that “there comes a point where this
Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.” Watts v. State of Ind., 338
U.S. 49, 52 (1949). Under these circumstances we should rely on the jury to apply their
judgment, experience and knowledge of the community in arriving at a fair assessment of the
damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965).
98

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 485.

99

See, e.g., McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000); King,
Reformulation, supra note 6; Fischer, supra note 12, See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
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creating a brighter line approach (i.e. clarifying the doctrine and how it should be
applied).
These proposals should have the beneficial effects of fostering
predictability and eliminating arbitrariness by courts in their interpretations of the
doctrine and juries in their evaluation of causation of a previously ill-defined injury.
Part III.C then evaluates these proposals considering the cases and authorities cited
by the Roberts court.
Finally, Part III.D responds to the anticipated
counterarguments to the proposals advocated in Part III.C.
A. The Theoretical Problem
The doctrinal problem of compensating lost chances could be approached in two
ways: it could be approached by relaxing the traditional causation requirement, or by
defining the lost chance itself as a separate, compensable injury. Different legal
consequences follow depending on which option is chosen.
It remains unclear under Roberts which choice is now the law of Ohio, and the
lower courts have accordingly come to some conflicting conclusions. From a policy
standpoint, the lack of a clear definition of the injury in a loss-of-chance case and
causation requirements results in: (1) inefficiency in the courts; (2) a lack of clear
standards for juries in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied their burden of
proving causation; and (3) arbitrariness and unfairness to both plaintiffs and
defendants alike as it becomes a matter of chance as to how a court will interpret
Roberts and how a jury will respond lacking clear guidance from the court.
B. The Significance of the Theoretical Problem, as Shown by Confusion
in Lower Ohio Court Cases Decided under Roberts
Conflicting decisions and views in cases decided after Roberts demonstrate the
confusion Roberts has created as to: (1) what standard of proof is required to prove
causation; and (2) how to define the injury in a loss-of-chance case.
1. Standard of Proof Requirements.
A review of cases decided since Roberts indicates that Ohio courts have not
exactly agreed on how Roberts should be applied. In Starkey v. St. Rita’s Med.
Ctr.,100 the court cites Roberts for the proposition that under the loss-of-chance
doctrine, the plaintiff need not prove, through a medical expert, that the injury was
more likely than not caused by the defendant’s negligence although the plaintiff still
has the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant brought about the harm the plaintiff has suffered.101 In Starkey, the court
overturned a judgment for the defendant because it could not determine whether the
jury found that the defendant was simply not negligent, or was negligent, but the
plaintiff failed to prove causation by a reasonable probability (because under
Roberts, the plaintiffs no longer have to prove causation by a reasonable probability

100

690 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).

101

See id. at 62. The Starkey court does not address the issue of whether the injury is the
loss of chance or the physical result of the defendant’s acts or omissions, rather the court
focuses on the standard of causation that the plaintiff must prove.
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standard).102 It is far from clear what standard of proof this court feels a plaintiff
must meet.103
In Paul v. Metrohealth St. Lukes Med. Ctr.,104 a wrongful death action based on
medical malpractice, the plaintiff’s expert testified that, within a reasonable degree
of medical probability, the care provided to the plaintiff by the defendant fell below
the accepted standard of care and that the hospital staff should have acted
immediately when the victim began experiencing seizures.105 The court upheld a
judgment in favor of the defendant and held that the plaintiff’s expert failed to
demonstrate that defendant’s alleged medical malpractice was the proximate cause to
a degree of medical certainty or medical probability as required by Roberts.106
Further, the court held that Roberts does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving “but-for” causation and that the plaintiff failed to establish a probable causal
link between the defendant’s actions and the resulting harm to the decedent.107 This
court appears to have reached an entirely different conclusion than the Starkey court
as to what Roberts requires a plaintiff to prove. In Paul, the court, by defining the
injury as the death and requiring the plaintiff to meet a “but-for” causation standard,
has placed a greater burden on the plaintiff to establish causation than appears to be
called for by Roberts.108
2. Defining the Injury.
In Shockey v. Our Lady of Mercy Mariemont,109 a medical malpractice case, the
court stated, “the decision in Roberts did not so much change the law of causation …
as it recognized a new compensable harm. [Here the plaintiff] did not assert that this
harm—the loss of a chance of recovery—occurred.”110 This interpretation of Roberts
appears to define the injury as the loss of chance and not the physical harm.
In McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp.,111 a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court
concluded the loss-of-chance doctrine did not apply where negligence of hospital
personnel directly caused the ultimate harm to the patient and decided the case based
on traditional negligence principles.112 Justice Resnick, in dicta discussing the loss-

102

See id. at 63.

103

See supra Part II.D.2.

104

No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *1 (8th Dist. Ohio App. Oct. 22, 1998).

105

See id. at *15.

106

See id. at *7.

107

Id.

108

See supra Part II.F.

109

No. C-960492, 1997 WL 346104, at *1 (1st Dist. Ohio Ct. App. June 25, 1997).

110

Id. at *3.

111

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000).

112

See id. at 1124-25. For a thorough discussion of the holding and impact of this case see
Jason Perkins, Note, McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals: Legal Recovery for
Terminally Ill and Injured Patients Without the Lost Chance Doctrine, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 451
(2001); see also Reuscher, supra note 66.
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of-chance doctrine, gave some insight into her view concerning the injury in loss-ofchance when she stated “[t]he focus then shifts away from the cause of the ultimate
harm itself, and is directed instead on the extent to which the defendant’s negligence
caused a reduction in the victim’s likelihood of achieving a more favorable
outcome.”113 This implied that Justice Resnick felt the injury was the ultimate
physical injury and not the loss-of-chance itself. However, in his dissent, Chief
Justice Moyer described the injury in loss-of-chance cases as “the injury of having
been deprived of a chance of a more favorable ultimate result.”114 Further, Chief
Justice Moyer touched on the causation standard under Roberts when he stated:
Accordingly, in lost chance cases, those plaintiffs who are unable to meet
the “but for” test (that the full extent of their injuries would not have
occurred but for negligence on the part of medical providers) are not
completely barred from recovery. Rather, they receive damages in
proportion to the percentage of chance of recovery of which they were
deprived.115
Under this view, a plaintiff does not have to meet the “but for” causation standard.
This seems to contradict the view of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Paul, which
requires a plaintiff to prove “but for” causation as to the ultimate injury.116
C. Proposed Solution: Consider Loss of Chance a Compensable “Injury” in
Medical Malpractice cases and Require Plaintiffs Prove Causation by a
Preponderance
1. The Injury Suffered in a Loss-of-Chance Should be Defined as the
Lost Chance Itself.
Determining the injury is critical because the trier of fact cannot answer the
question of causation unless it knows which injury the defendant’s act or omission is
said to have caused. If the injury is the ultimate physical harm (e.g., death or
physical disability), then the causation question is whether the defendant’s negligent
act caused the death or disability. Alternatively, the causation question is much
clearer for the trier of fact if the injury is defined as the loss-of-chance itself.117 In
the latter case, a plaintiff need prove only that it was more likely than not that the
defendant’s negligence caused the loss-of-chance.118
The majority in Roberts does not clearly define the injury. However, both Chief
Justice Moyer and Justice Cook acknowledge the issue of identifying the injury in

113

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1123 (emphasis added).

114

Id. at 1128 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).

115

Id.

116

See Paul, No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *7.

117

See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9, at 1785; Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J.,
concurring).
118

See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9; Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J.,
concurring); Truckor, supra note 66, at 358.
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their dissenting opinions in Roberts.119 Chief Justice Moyer argues that the holding
of the case goes beyond wrongful death cases and creates a new common law cause
of action for loss-of-chance noting that the holding makes it a “jury question as to
whether the defendant’s negligence was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury or death.”120
Justice Cook, in dissenting, notes that the injury and the basis of the claim in loss-ofchance cases, in some jurisdictions, is “the reduced possibility of survival, and not
the death itself.”121
The majority in Roberts cite a number of cases from other jurisdictions in support
of the decision; however, this only adds to the confusion because the cases are not in
agreement as to whether the injury is the physical harm or the discrete injury of the
loss-of-chance itself.122 The majority also cites Professor King’s article, discussed
above, in which he advocates the loss-of-chance itself as a legally compensable
interest.123 While the majority has not clearly adopted King’s position, they did
adopt his proportional damage approach124 to ascertaining the amount of damages
recoverable.125
Professor King126 and a plurality of the Washington Supreme Court in Herskovits
v. Group Health Co-op of Puget Sound,127 have defined the injury as the loss-ofchance itself. The benefit of defining the injury in this manner is that it establishes a
bright-line test, promotes efficiency and fairness, and logically connects the injury to
the valuation of damages as set forth by the court in Roberts. Defining the injury as
the physical harm creates uncertainty and unfairness due to confusion over causation.
2. The Plaintiff Should be Required to Prove Causation by Traditional
Preponderance Standards.128
The syllabus in Roberts states:
In order to maintain an action for the loss of a less-than-even chance of
recovery or survival, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony
showing that the health care provider’s negligent act or omission
increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff. It then becomes a jury question

119
See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 485-86 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting and Cook, J., separately
dissenting).
120
See id. at 485 (emphasis in original). In his dissent in McMullen, Chief Justice Moyer,
citing Roberts, once again implied the injury in loss-of-chance is not the death itself, rather it
is the “injury of having been deprived of a chance of a more favorable ultimate result.”
McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1128 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
121

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 486 (Cook, J., dissenting).

122

See, e.g., Herskovits, 664 N.W.2d at 474-87, for the best illustration of this conflict.

123

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483-84 (citing King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1353-54).

124

See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1372-73 and 1381-87.

125

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484 (citing King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1381-87).

126

See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1353-54.

127

See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J., concurring).

128

For an excellent discussion of cause in fact see Robertson, supra note 9.
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as to whether the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the plaintiff’s
injury or death.129
This statement is not a bright-line rule; rather it appears to leave the question to
the jury to decide whether the defendant caused the injury or death. By what standard
is the jury to determine causation? If the answer is by a preponderance, the question
remains - what is the injury? If the injury is the ultimate physical injury and the
standard to be applied is the preponderance, how then is the jury ever to reach a
conclusion that it was more likely than not that a defendant caused the death of a
victim with a 40% chance of survival before the defendant’s negligence and a 25%
chance after the negligence?130 This would be illogical since Roberts requires the
jury to consider expert testimony in ascertaining the percentage of the patient’s lost
chance of survival or recovery in calculating damages.131 For a jury to find a
defendant liable in this situation would require it to find it more likely than not that
the defendant caused the ultimate physical injury, but that the chance of survival or
recovery was already less than 50%. Such a finding is contradictory on its face.
In adopting the loss of less-than-even chance of survival rule stated above, the
Roberts court states that it is following the approach set forth in Section 323,
Restatement of Torts.132 The court cites Herskovits133 and Hamil v. Bashline134 as
examples of courts that apply Section 323 and standing for the proposition that:
[O]nce the plaintiff proves that the defendant has increased the risk of
harm by depriving the patient of a chance to recover, the case can go to
the jury on the issue of causation regardless of whether the plaintiff could
prove to a degree of medical probability that the defendant caused the
patient’s injury or death.135
The court implies that Section 323 is an alternative to the “substantial possibility”
causation standard in Hicks.136 Causation requirements for cases falling under
Section 323, and the cases cited by the court in Roberts, are generally regarded by
commentators as falling into the category of “relaxed proof of causation.” 137 The
“relaxed causation” approach generally takes the underlying injury (i.e., patient’s
death or physical disability) as the injury for which the patient is compensated and
allows the question to go to the jury with less than a normal threshold of proof.138

129

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481 syllabus n.1.

130

This is the illustration used by the court in Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 485.

131

See id. at 481 syllabus n.3.

132

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484.

133

Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474.

134

392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).

135

Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483.

136

See id. at 482-83 (citing Hicks, 368 F.2d 626).

137

See cases and articles cited supra notes 56-69.

138

See id.
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There are several problems with the court’s reliance on Section 323 and these
cases. Section 323 provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon
the undertaking.139
The Reporters’ Note to Section 26 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts discusses
the fact that a number of courts adopting a lost-opportunity version of harm have
relied on Section 323.140 As the reporter points out:
This reliance on § 323 is misplaced. Section 323 is contained in Chapter
12, which addresses the general principles of a negligence claim. Its
placement in Topic 7, entitled ‘Duties of Affirmative Action,’ reveals that
it addresses the question of the existence of a duty and its scope for a
person who undertakes to protect another from harm. The Second
Restatement addresses causal matters in Chapter 16, The Causal Relation
Necessary to Responsibility for Negligence, in §§ 430-461.141
As the above discussion makes clear, Section 323 deals with the duty and breach
elements of negligence and not causation.142 Relying on a Section 323 approach to
causation is misplaced because Section 323 does not address causation.
Even when Section 323 applies,143 causation must still be proven according to the
traditional rules of negligence.144 In a situation to which Section 323 applies, the
139

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).

140

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26
cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).

REPORTERS’ NOTE

141

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
142

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, at 164-65.

143

Courts that have adopted Section 323 have not necessarily agreed on how the jury
should be instructed when Section 323 applies. Compare Thompson, 688 P.2d 605 (holding
that the jury in medical malpractice cases should be allowed to consider an increase in the
chance of harm on the issue of causation, but this did not mean the jury should be instructed
under the Restatement rule, rather the Restatement rule merely allows the court to permit
evidence of increased risk of harm and the jury must still be instructed to decide in favor of the
defendant unless it finds it probable that the defendant was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury),
with DeBurkarte v. Louvar 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (upholding jury instructions in a
medical malpractice case that permitted the jury to award damages based on a finding that the
defendant’s tortious conduct increased the risk of harm to the victim by depriving her of an
opportunity to receive timely treatment, but did not permit the jury to find that the defendant
caused the victim’s imminent death), and with Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 431 A.2d 920
(Pa. 1981) (finding that a plaintiff was entitled to an instruction based on Section 323 and that
proximate cause could be established by evidence that the defendant’s negligent act or
omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff).
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negligence is frequently an omission (e.g., a failure to act to protect the injured party
from some other force). In such cases the other force (e.g., a preexisting medical
condition or a storm that washes a seaman overboard) is what causes the ultimate
physical injury; consequently, as the drafters of the second Restatement themselves
observe, we will almost always be unable to say with certainty that the failure to act
caused the ultimate injury.145 Such cases will always involve an analysis of what
might have happened if the alleged tortfeasor had acted with reasonable care; the
loss-of-chance is the very thing that might have happened. As discussed in Part II.E,
policy considerations have historically led courts to allow non-medical cases to reach
a jury upon a minimal showing of causation146 (e.g., the seaman who drowns due to
negligent safety precautions or rescue efforts).147 In the non-medical cases, courts
have often held that if the matter was within the common experience of the
community, and was a question in which reasonable minds could differ, then the jury
was capable of balancing the equities.148 If they found in favor of the plaintiff, he
was awarded full damages.149
The policies that courts consider in reducing the plaintiff’s causation burden in
non-medical cases do not apply to medical malpractice cases. Loss-of-chance in the
medical malpractice context is different than non-medical cases for at least two
reasons. First, medical malpractice is not normally within the common experience of
the community. Second, in the non-medical case, the victim’s chance of avoiding
the adverse consequence in the absence of the defendant’s negligence is generally
unknowable. In the loss of a less-than-even chance of recovery or survival in the
medical malpractice situation, the victim’s chance of survival, by definition, is less
144

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965) (addressing burden of
proof). The Restatement states:
The plaintiff is not however, required to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. He
is not required to eliminate entirely all possibility that the defendant’s conduct was not
a cause. It is enough that he introduces evidence from which reasonable men may
conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that
it was not. The fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no man can
say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the defendant had acted
otherwise. If, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission might be
expected to produce a particular result, and if that result has in fact followed, the
conclusion may be justified that the causal relation exists. In drawing that conclusion,
the triers of fact are permitted to draw upon ordinary human experience as to the
probabilities of the case. Thus when a child is drowned in a swimming pool, no one
can say with absolute certainty that a lifeguard would have saved him; but the
common experience of the community permits the conclusion that the guard would
more probably than not have done so, and hence that the absence of the guard has
played a substantial part in bringing about the death of the child. Such questions are
normally for the jury, and the court may seldom rule on them as matters of law.
Id.
145

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965).

146

See discussion supra Part II.D.2.

147

See Zinnel, 10 F.2d 47.

148

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B cmt. b (1965).

149

See Fischer, supra note 12, at 652.
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than 50% before the negligent act or omission. However, even if a patient’s chances
are less than 50%, advances in medical technology mean patients can often survive
diseases and injuries they could never have survived just a few years earlier;
frequently these favorable outcomes can be demonstrated statistically. Lay jurors
may understand this intuitively, but are still not likely to be in a position to conclude
that malpractice caused the adverse consequence. Assisted by expert testimony, lay
jurors can apply their judgment and make a determination whether the malpractice
caused the injury of the loss of chance itself. Under these circumstances, there
should be no need to relax the causation standards. The focus of causation should
not be on the ultimate physical harm, but instead upon the lost opportunity, which
can be established through expert testimony and frequently reduced to statistical
probabilities.150 Since proximate causation is almost never an issue in loss-of-chance
cases,151 if the plaintiff can prove that it is more likely than not that but-for the
defendant’s negligence the injury of the loss-of-chance itself would not have
occurred, then the only remaining question should be the amount of damages.152
The Roberts court cites Hamil153 and Herskovits154 as two cases in support of its
approach to applying Section 323 to loss-of-chance.155 Important differences exist,
however, between the holdings in these cases and the approach adopted by the
Roberts court.
In Hamil, the court clearly defined the injury as the ultimate physical harm
suffered, not merely the loss-of-chance.156 By contrast, the Roberts court did not
define the injury as the ultimate physical harm.157 Further, the Hamil court gave no
indication that the damages should be reduced to reflect the percentage of lost
opportunity.158 The Roberts court, on the other hand, clearly adopted the
proportional approach to valuing the loss of a less than even chance of recovery or
survival.159 Because the plaintiff in Hamil arguably demonstrated that the victim lost
150

This Note is not advocating that the doctrine should only apply to medical malpractice
cases when it can be proven through the use of statistical probabilities. However, statistics are
useful in many cases, particularly as a factor in ascertaining damages. See supra note 97.
151

See supra Part II.B.

152

See Robertson, supra note 9.

153
Hamil, 392 A.2d 1280. In Hamil, the alleged medical malpractice was the defendant’s
failure to properly diagnose and treat the plaintiff’s condition in a manner that might have
prevented the harm. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Section 323 to relax the
degree of certainty normally required of plaintiff’s evidence. See id. at 1286. Once the
plaintiff has introduced evidence that a defendant’s negligent act or omission increased the
risk of harm to the plaintiff, and that harm was in fact sustained, it becomes a jury question
whether or not the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the harm. Id. at 1286.
154

Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474.

155

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483 (citing Hamil, 392 A. 2d 1280; Herskovits, 664 P.2d

474).
156

See Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1286, n.5.

157

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480.

158

See Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1282-83.

159

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484-85.
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a greater than 50% chance of survival due to the defendant’s negligence, it is not
clear how much, if at all, the Hamil court actually relaxed the standard of proof for
causation.160 The court noted that the burden of proof necessary to warrant a jury
verdict for the plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence,161 and the jury, not the
medical expert, has the task of balancing the probabilities.162
Herskovits163 is another case cited by the court in Roberts as standing for the
proposition that under Section 323, once the plaintiff proves that the defendant
increased the risk of harm by depriving the patient of a chance to recover, the case
can go to the jury on the issue of causation regardless of whether the plaintiff could
prove to a degree of medical probability that the defendant caused the patient’s
injury or death.164
The problem with relying on Herskovits is that the majority of the Washington
Supreme Court recognized the loss-of-chance doctrine, but they were split as to their
reasoning.165 Two of the six justices in the majority held the view that the plaintiff
proved that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s subsequent death because they
160
In Hamil, the court stated that the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert was that there was
a 75% chance of recovery had prompt treatment been rendered and this was a sufficient basis
upon which the jury could have concluded that it was more likely than not that the defendant’s
omissions were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s death. See Hamil, 392 A.2d at
1288, n.9.
161

In Hamil, the court stated:
The quantum of proof necessary to warrant a jury verdict for the plaintiff is … a
preponderance of the evidence. This is made clear in Comment (a) to Section 433B of
the Restatement: ‘a. Subsection (1) states the general rule (that burden of proof as to
causation is on the plaintiff). As on other issues in civil cases, the plaintiff is required
to produce evidence that the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm he has suffered, and to sustain his burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. This means that he must make it appear that it is more
likely than not the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly
balanced, it becomes a duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.’
Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1288, n.9.
162

See id. at 1288.

163

Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474.

164

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483.

165

Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474, 474-87. In Herskovits, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that recovery was proper on behalf of a plaintiff-decedent whose chances of
surviving cancer had been reduced, according to expert testimony, from 39% to 25% as a
result of the defendant’s medical malpractice. See, id. The majority was split with only two
of the justices holding the view that the plaintiff proved the defendant caused the plaintiff’s
subsequent death because they proved that the defendant’s negligent act was a substantial
factor that increased the risk of death. Id. at 474-79. The remaining four justices on the
majority took the view that, based on the expert testimony, the defendant’s negligence
probably did not cause (under traditional requirements of establishing proximate cause) the
decedent’s death and damages were not appropriate on that basis. Id. at 479-87 (Pearson, J.,
concurring). However, these four justices felt that the loss of a less than even chance itself
was an actionable injury. Id.
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proved that the defendant’s negligent act was a “substantial factor” that increased the
risk of death.166 Concurring in the opinion, four of the justices took the view that,
based on the expert testimony, the defendant’s negligence probably did not cause
(under traditional requirements of establishing proximate cause) the decedent’s death
and damages were not appropriate on that basis; however, these four justices felt that
the loss of a less than even chance itself was an actionable injury.167 In concurring,
Justice Pearson stated that “[u]nder this interpretation, a person will ‘cause’ the death
of another person [within the meaning of the wrongful death statute] whenever he
causes a substantial reduction in that person’s chance of survival.”168
The Roberts court did not adopt the substantial factor test advocated by two of
the justices in the majority in Herskovits, nor did they clearly state that they agreed
with the four justices in the plurality. There are several ways to interpret the Roberts
court’s reliance on Herskovits. Arguably, it could be fairly implied that the Roberts
court did not so much relax causation standards as it redefined the injury (or perhaps
relaxed the definition of the injury) as the lost chance itself.
Ultimately, the problem we are left with is that the Roberts court did not provide
a clear statement that resolves important questions concerning the injury and
causation elements. The cases cited, as well as the adoption of the proportional
damages approach to valuing lost chances advocated by Professor King, by the
Roberts court, however, make a strong argument for applying traditional notions of
proving causation169 to an injury defined as the lost chance itself.
D. Counterarguments to the Proposed Solution
Critics of this proposal to clarify the loss-of-chance doctrine may argue that this
would be bad policy because it creates an economic incentive for plaintiffs to litigate
and thus invites a flood of frivolous litigation. The risk of frivolous litigation,
however, is not unique to causes of action based on loss-of-chance. Frivolous
litigation is a cost of contingency fees and the American Rule, which generally
prohibits recovery of legal fees by the prevailing party in litigation.170 The reality is
that the decision in Roberts merely brings Ohio in line with the majority of
jurisdictions throughout the country in recognizing a plaintiff’s right to recover for
the tortious destruction of the loss-of-chance. Given that plaintiffs can currently
bring suit under the loss-of-chance doctrine, it is hard to see how clarifying the
definition of the injury and standards of causation significantly adds to the risk that
new plaintiffs will see this as an opportunity to initiate a frivolous suit.
Critics may argue that because of loss-of-chance claims medical providers will
either be driven out of the practice of medicine (or at least stay away from patients
with preexisting conditions) or pass on the costs of higher malpractice insurance;
either way, the results are higher healthcare costs for society. To a certain degree
these observations seem reasonable. These criticisms, however, overlook several
166

Id. at 474-79.

167

Id. at 479-87.

168

Id.

169

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002); Robertson, supra note 9; KEETON ET AL., supra note 15.
170

10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 54.170 (3d ed. 1997).
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points. First, as discussed above, the loss-of-chance doctrine is already with us and it
is not clear that clarifying certain aspects of the doctrine will add such significant
costs that it would be an unfair burden on society. Second, this is really a criticism of
the tort system in general, and medical malpractice in particular. It would be unfair
to single out the victims of loss-of-chance for harsher treatment than victims of other
torts.
It is also worth noting that recent studies show that medical malpractice causes
more deaths each year than motor vehicle accidents,171 but the vast majority of these
victims never pursue these medical malpractice cases.172 If one accepts the accuracy
of these studies, it seems fair to conclude that most of the cost of malpractice is not
borne by the tortfeasors themselves or society overall, but rather by individual
victims of malpractice. The real question we should ask is whether it is fair to make
a victim of medical malpractice bear the entire cost of the injury. Tort policies of
deterrence, fairness, victim compensation, and loss spreading would seem to favor
recovery even where the injury sustained is a lost chance.173 Concerns over the
equitable treatment of a defendant in these cases must be considered in light of the
fact that the victim did not bargain for, nor knowingly submit to, the increased risk
that the defendant’s negligence exposed the victim to. Rather, the victim relied on
the defendant to protect the victim from the very harm that occurred.174
Critics may also point out that current political trends indicate a strong desire for
tort reform and a desire to cap damages by tort plaintiffs.175 These legislative
initiatives, however, are not aimed at eliminating legitimate causes of action, but
rather limiting excessive damage awards.176 The reality is that there is nothing
inconsistent with this proposal to eliminate much of the uncertainty in the law
concerning loss-of-chance and a cap on noneconomic damage awards. Both
proposals, if enacted, can peacefully coexist.
Critics may argue that the transaction costs (i.e., legal fees, court costs, etc.) to
defendants and society will in many cases exceed the total damages. This criticism
overlooks the economic reality on the plaintiff’s side. Plaintiffs’ lawyers may be
disinclined to take loss-of-chance cases on a contingency basis because damages are
likely to be drastically reduced to reflect the loss-of-chance.177 In addition, plaintiffs
will themselves incur the cost of obtaining expert testimony to establish causation
and the applicable standard of care. The economic reality is that many plaintiffs and
their lawyers will frequently decline to take the economic risks associated with lossof-chance cases when the potential damages are not significant. In addition,
clarifying the law as proposed by this Note establishes a brighter line approach, and

171

See Fischer, supra note 12, at 652.

172

See id. (citing studies showing only one claim is filed for every five to ten negligently
inflicted injuries).
173

See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 54.

174

See supra note 97.

175

See, e.g., S.B. 281, 124th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2002).

176

See id.

177

See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484; see also supra Part II.E, and note 97.
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should have the beneficial effect of reducing resources expended by both lawyers
and courts handling loss-of-chance cases.
Another criticism is that the loss-of-chance doctrine could swallow up the
traditional law of negligence because arguably the doctrine could be raised in
virtually every case of tortious conduct involving questionable causation.178 As
discussed in detail in Part II.E, the loss-of-chance doctrine has been applied almost
exclusively in the context of medical malpractice. Defining the injury in loss-ofchance cases as the lost opportunity itself is not likely to cause courts to become less
reluctant to allow the doctrine to be applied in nonmedical malpractice cases.
Additionally, plaintiffs in non-malpractice cases have an incentive to use traditional
negligence concepts of injury and causation because in non-malpractice cases
causation requirements are already relaxed and by relying on traditional concepts
plaintiffs can win full damages for the ultimate injury rather than proportionally
reduced compensation for lost chances.179
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Roberts was an important step by the Ohio Supreme Court in
correcting a view that was unfair to victims of lost chances in medical malpractice
cases. The decision, however, has created confusion and left unanswered some
important questions. Most importantly, in considering the case of a loss of a lessthan-even chance of recovery or survival, defining the injury as the lost chance itself
is the fairest and most logical means of solving the fundamental problem of proving
causation. Importantly, it has the beneficial effect of retaining the traditional test for
causation.180 This bright line approach fosters predictability and is less arbitrary than
a relaxed causation approach. Indeed, relaxed causation approaches are inherently
illogical because they ask the jury to find it more likely than not that the defendant’s
negligence caused a death or disability that there was already a less-than-even
chance of avoiding. Until either the state legislature or the Ohio Supreme Court
addresses these problems, victims of medical malpractice cannot be certain of fair
treatment in Ohio courts in the case of a loss of chance of recovery or survival.
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